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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 11 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA
Mr. G.D. COMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Baron C.A. von PLATEN
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. G. EL-ABD
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the thirty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): First, I would like to thank the representative of Bulgaria for allowing me to speak before him this morning. As I think most members know, I have to leave for two days to attend the dedication of the new Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton University in honour of the late Mr. John Foster Dulles. I shall be back on Wednesday morning.

For the past two weeks, since we entered into a discussion of stage I problems arising in both the Soviet and the United States outlines of draft disarmament treaties (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1), this Conference has been the scene of expositions by representatives of the Soviet bloc and the Western delegations, with very welcome interventions from time to time by other representatives. The statements recorded in our verbatim records have ranged far and wide, not only over the specific measures recommended for stage I, but also over some aspects of stages II and III, and over divergent philosophical and practical approaches for achieving general and complete disarmament. I shall be continuing my exposition of stage I and other parts of the United States outline in the days ahead, and I am sure that the Soviet representative also has further exposition in mind.

With the continuation of discussion it has become ever more apparent to my delegation that one of the primary requisites for our progress in this Committee is the development of a greater unity of concept, a greater meeting of minds on the overall framework in which disarmament is to be attempted. I say this because, to a considerable degree, the specific measures which each side finds itself advocating are derived from an effort to implement the overall approach.

I should like today to explore some of the fundamental gaps between the thinking and the attitudes of the East and of the West in an effort to determine whether this may help us towards a better understanding of our current difficulties.

The Soviet delegation has told us several times that its primary consideration is to eliminate the risk of nuclear war as rapidly as possible. This has led it to propose the total elimination in the first stage of the vehicles capable of delivering means of mass destruction. Having advanced this

(Mr. Dean, United States)

fundamental idea, our Soviet colleagues have gone on to claim that the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be disadvantageous to the Warsaw Pact States if all foreign bases were not totally abolished at the same time and if Western troops were not pulled back to their home territories.

Compared with these very early and somewhat drastic cuts in the Western plans, the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments is to proceed more slowly under the Soviet plan. Moreover, measures directed against nuclear weapon stockpiles and production would not be undertaken until stage II. As against these relative delays, however, it must be noted that the Soviet plan would allegedly be accomplished within four years of the entry into force of the disarmament treaty.

The United States plan, on the other hand, is, we submit fairer and more comprehensive in that it does not attempt to single out any particular aspect of the military establishment for drastic and exceptional treatment in any stage.

As I said at the twenty-third meeting on 18 April, the idea which stands behind the United States plan is a very simple one:

"Fundamentally it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military positions of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning."

(ENDC/PV.23, p. 6)

The world's present military picture is that of two great military alliances. The one which faces the several countries of the free world is the great communist military alliance. Its mainstay is the Soviet Union, occupying the heartland of Eurasia from the Baltic Sea to the shores of the Pacific Ocean adjacent to Communist China. It possesses great armies which are, in most cases, closely co-ordinated in equipment, planning and operations, and these armies can move from central points to countless points on the periphery of its territory where a number of smaller countries can be found. In addition, this alliance has nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them both near and far by aircraft, ships, missiles and rockets.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The other military alliance, which also possesses nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, contains the United States as its largest military Power, together with a number of other militarily important States. The specific problem of this alliance is that the home base of its centre of strength is separated from the heartland of Eurasia by the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans. The United States can exert its influence in maintaining the present military balance of power in Eurasia only by having sizeable contingents of its forces join the forces of its allies on their respective territories, and by maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent.

It is perfectly clear that all the elements of military power which I have enumerated, and many more as well, have a part to play in the existing military balance of power. The Soviet Union says that it just does not like some aspects of the existing balance, that it feels threatened by the bases of the West on the territory of Eurasia, and that it worries about a surprise attack involving Western nuclear weapons. We say that we, too, are concerned over a possible surprise attack, that we worry about the centrally deployed and integrated armies of the Warsaw Powers, that there are other factors of instability in military affairs which worry us gravely.

Of course, these preoccupations have taken root on each side, and they are natural in such a dangerous situation. It is precisely because of this that both sides find themselves overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the amount of national security which each gets from its vast armaments and from the armaments race. That is why we have this great impetus towards general and complete disarmament. Let me say clearly, without equivocation, that the United States is 100 per cent for general and complete disarmament. Let there be no doubt on that point.

My delegation is firmly convinced, however, that we must not disturb the existing military pattern while we are carrying out the process of abolition. I do not say that we must live with this existing degree of acute reciprocal danger, because it is the very aim of our disarmament programme to reduce this danger progressively, dramatically and drastically as we proceed from stage to stage. Nevertheless, it is wholly unrealistic to think that the disarmament process itself can be a vehicle for altering the nature of the world military picture, even for the relatively short period during which we are implementing a disarmament treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In other words, there is no basic cure for the insecurity under which we all live except the attainment of general and complete disarmament itself, accompanied by appropriate agreed measures to keep the peace. Spectacular measures for which the sponsors claim miraculous corrective effects are generally found upon close examination either not to work or to give security to one side at the price of augmenting insecurity for the other.

I hope that my Soviet colleague will not soon raise his voice to say that the United States has now spoken out against the abolition of delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. What I have said is that any scheme for their 100 per cent abolition in the first stage of our programme would produce serious maladjustments in the existing military balance. That is why the West favours gradual abolition over three stages. The Soviet approach would increase substantially the importance of conventional forces and armaments and enhance the military posture of the States within the Soviet bloc which have the greatest strength in such fields. It would alter the existing military mix, that is, the composition of armaments on which each country has come to rely for security and on which it must continue to rely until disarmament has been achieved.

Indeed, I must ask my Soviet colleague to point to any mandate for 100 per cent destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage as against the provision contained in the United States plan to spread such destruction over the three stages. Paragraph 3(c) of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) says only that provisions for eliminating all such vehicles must be in the disarmament programme. Paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Soviet plan speaks of obliging States to eliminate these vehicles during the four-year disarmament programme. It is only later on, in articles 5 to 8, that the Soviet draft treaty insists that the liquidation of nuclear weapon vehicles be completed in stage I.

It will be recalled that I have already noted that any such arrangement would prejudice the Western military position at a time when disarmament was only in the first stage. This unfair effect would be multiplied by the companion measures relating to what the Soviet Union is pleased to call "foreign bases and foreign troops stationed abroad", which it declares must go hand-in-glove with the abolition of delivery vehicles in the first stage. I have already explained the role which such bases play in the world military picture, so the consequences of the sudden abolition of these foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom should be clear enough.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

If the Soviet Union were to accept the Western plan for a 30 per cent cut in nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage there would be no objective military reason for eliminating these foreign bases in the first stage. Both sides would have begun the process of squeezing down their military might towards an eventual zero -- that is what we want to do -- but the military balance currently in existence would not be altered in the process.

I have not forgotten that in a recent speech Mr. Zorin raised a dreadful spectre. In that speech he said that under the United States plan we could in the first stage absorb most or all of the 30 per cent cut in armaments in the domestic United States and leave all our strength intact at these forward bases near the Soviet Union. Then Mr. Zorin claimed that the Soviet Union would be at a disadvantage with its 30 per cent cut in home-based forces, while nearby United States forces would remain at 100 per cent. I presume that Soviet bases in Eastern Germany, which are near France, the Low Countries, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, would not count under Soviet calculations.

I only wish that my Soviet colleague had put as much imagination into the Soviet disarmament plan as he showed himself capable of producing in raising this dreadful spectre. I cannot believe that Mr. Zorin has forgotten that the United States programme calls, in the first stage, for a 30 per cent across-the-board cut in armaments. Mr. Zorin knows full well that the United States launching pads for intercontinental ballistic missiles are located in the United States and not at bases elsewhere. Therefore, here the 30 per cent cut for the United States would be at home. Mr. Zorin is also fully aware that our intermediate range ballistic missiles would be useless for the protection of our alliance if they were installed at United States bases. Here the 30 per cent cut would apply to our bases abroad. The same is largely true of different types of bomber aircraft, some based at home and some based abroad. Thus, a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction would work out in quite a balanced fashion, and this is only natural since we could not afford to cut our domestic forces excessively in any case in order to maintain our forces abroad.

It seems to me that it is high time that we again refer to a basic fact in disarmament which the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, emphasized in his speech at our tenth plenary meeting. He then said:

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"The fact is that the United States and the Soviet Union are agreed that we should achieve general and complete disarmament. The first part of paragraph 1 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles so states. The objective, therefore, is to reduce national armaments to nothing -- to zero per cent. This is in the Soviet plan; it is in the United States plan. There is no significant difference between the Soviet Union and the United States as to the amount of disarmament sought.

"Both the United States and the Soviet Union, in getting to that condition of general and complete disarmament -- from the present levels to zero -- must pass by the 90 per cent, the 70 per cent, the 50 per cent and so on, levels of retained arms, whatever our arrangements. So here, too, there can be no significant difference between the United States and the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.10, p.11)

I have already spoken about why we favour gradual reduction over three stages so that the existing world military balance is not upset in the course of carrying out disarmament. Now, however, I would like to ask the Soviet delegation to come forward with some sort of explanation of how it expects to get us and itself from the level of 100 per cent of armaments to the zero level. My question applies, as the quotation from Secretary of State Rusk's statement makes clear, whether this reduction is to take place in one, two, or three stages, whether in one or ten years.

In the case of nuclear weapon vehicles, there is not a single clue anywhere in the Soviet draft treaty to the modalities of liquidation. The same is true in the case of nuclear weapons. Only a little more is said about armed forces and conventional armaments, and that not very specifically. We know that the troops somehow designated for demobilization are to be paraded in front of the disarmament inspectors as they are discharged from the armed forces and that their weapons are to be left behind them in the camp for destruction. Here, too, the degree of imprecision in the Soviet draft is startling.

I hope that the representative of the Soviet Union does not answer at this point that the West is pressing for too many details, or even for data on control measures, when the present negotiating need is for rather broad-brush agreement on disarmament measures and their sequence and timing. However, I would submit that we are now dealing with instances where the nature of the disarmament measure and, indeed, the possibility of assessing its implications on military establishments cannot be accurately gauged until we know more about how the measure is to be carried out.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The statement of the representative of Canada at our thirtieth plenary meeting (ENDC/PV.30, pp.6 - 13) demonstrated very clearly why this is the case. He asked at that time whether the Soviet plan contemplated the simultaneous destruction of all delivery vehicles at one moment at different collection points for such vehicles throughout the world. If so, he asked, how are the vehicles to be assembled at such collection points, that is, in what sequence? At what point in this process will it be permitted to begin searches for possible hidden nuclear weapon vehicles which one or another State may not have declared to the international disarmament organization? Or, if the Soviet programme envisages the step-by-step destruction of delivery vehicles in a balanced way during the first stage in both East and West, how would this differ from the step-by-step destruction under the United States plan over three stages? Would not the same methods of operation and control have to apply in each case?

To be sure, Mr. Zorin might reply that there is a great deal of difference between getting from 100 per cent to zero in nuclear weapon vehicles in one stage and arriving at the same result in three stages over a longer period of time. I would agree. In the first instance, we would have a result that unbalances the existing military pattern by liquidating vehicles while nuclear weapons and substantial conventional forces and armaments remain in being. In the second instance, on the contrary, we would have the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles parallel with the reduction and liquidation of all other types of armaments and armed forces.

This brings us to the matter of the time-limits which each side has proposed for various stages. The Soviet plan envisages a six-month preparatory period after the treaty enters into force, followed by a fifteen-month stage I, a fifteen-month stage II, and a twelve-month stage III. The United States plan prescribes a three-year stage I, a three-year stage II, and a stage III time-limit to be fixed by us here before the end of these negotiations.

Mr. Lall, the representative of India, believes strongly that the quicker disarmament is accomplished, the better. At the thirtieth meeting he said he favoured a four-to-five-year plan, or even less, because it would ease control problems and allow mutual trust to build up more quickly.

(Mr. Dean United States)

The representative of Nigeria, on the other hand, wisely said at the thirty-first plenary meeting that:

"...but the real issue is not the time-limit as such but what we can achieve during the stages." (ENDC/PV.31, p.5)

A few minutes later, speaking of the Soviet plan, he added:

"A period of four years for complete disarmament would have to be considered in the light of the problems which we have not yet resolved and of the magnitude of which we are not yet fully aware."
(ibid., p. 3-5)

Now we all have to use our best judgement about what is the more sensible, realistic and attainable approach. I must say, however, that when I hear my Soviet colleague claim that the entire world can be totally disarmed in four years I am reminded of the Soviet delegation's adamant insistence in 1960 and 1961, during the nuclear test ban Conference, that not enough of the international control system could be constructed quickly enough to permit any control operations to begin in less than four years after the entry into force of the test ban treaty.

Be that as it may, my government, with the best will in the world, still has grave doubts about our realistic ability to speed up disarmament beyond the time table set forth in the United States programme. After all, quite apart from all the technical complications, there are the well-known difficulties about control. Since we know that the Soviet Union will accept only very incomplete controls at first, we think that it is preferable to build up somewhat more gradually to 100 per cent inspection and control while carrying out gradually more far-reaching disarmament measures.

Even beyond this we think that it will be very sound to make the transition from an armed to a disarmed world with all deliberate and reasonable speed, but also with some caution. We are, after all, asking for a very profound change in the way that men have thought and acted over thousands of years, and in their habits. Difficult adjustments are inevitable at best; and undue haste could be fatal to achieving our goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Finally, we cannot overlook the problem of implementing peace-keeping measures to keep pace -- I repeat, to keep pace -- with the disarmament process. We regard this as very important. It is precisely here that some of the major differences between East and West have already appeared, and yet we are convinced that such peace-keeping measures must play a decisive role in ensuring world peace and the national and international security which is at the very base of our quest for total disarmament.

I say to my colleagues, therefore, that they should not leap to too hasty conclusions on this matter of time limits. Fortunately, there is some reason to hope that the factors and considerations involved will become better known as our negotiations here proceed.

I ask members to examine, as I know they will, all of our statements with care. But I would also urge my colleagues here not to take too literally, without careful examination of the facts involved, the assertions which Mr. Zorin has been making with regard to the provisions for transition from stage to stage in the United States draft treaty outline. I am referring specifically to his statements that those provisions are so worded as to give any member of the Security Council a veto over transition, and that this would allow the United States to keep disarmament from proceeding beyond the first stage.

Let us turn for a moment to the Soviet scheme for transition. Of what does it in fact consist? The Soviet draft outline provides that transition to the next stage will take place after the control council of the international disarmament organization has so decided. As it happens, article 42 of the Soviet draft treaty says that the council of the international disarmament commission shall take decisions by a two-thirds majority. It also declares that the council must ensure the proper representation of Western States, communist States and neutral States, in line with the distorted Soviet view of the world in which each State must be rigidly assigned to a bloc. If, for example, this means a council resembling the eleven-man control commission agreed to in 1961 at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, then the Soviet-bloc States would have enough votes by themselves to block a two-third vote. However, even if the three groups had exactly equal representation, the Soviet bloc would have to enlist the vote or abstention of only one additional member in order to be able to block a decision in favour of transition.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

More than this, we must not overlook article 40 of the Soviet draft treaty, which provides that:

"All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/2, p. 25)

Can we have any doubt that if the Soviet Union felt at the end of any stage that the United States, for example, had not properly carried out its treaty obligations the Soviet Union would say that transition raised a question affecting international security and, therefore, that the entire issue had to be put to the Security Council -- where, as we all know, the Soviet Union has a veto and, indeed, has used this veto some hundred times?

There is no reason not to be frank about this. We have to discuss it. In the present state of the world, before we have achieved general and complete disarmament, the fact is -- and we might as well face it -- that none of the great Powers can afford to give up its power to decline further implementation of such a fundamental agreement as a treaty on general and complete disarmament if that agreement is not being fulfilled or conscientiously carried out by all concerned. No great Power will continue to strip itself of its military strength if other great Powers are not believed to be stripping themselves pro tanto at the same time. This possible use of a veto over transition -- or some form of duration clause for the treaty -- merely recognizes the current facts of international life. I would like to add that it seems to me that the knowledge by all great Powers that each of them has this veto power will bring all of them to realize that they cannot gain much of a jump on one another by manoeuvring or by bad faith, or by incomplete implementation of their own obligations under the treaty.

Let me say just a few words about control problems, which I have touched on only briefly today in passing. We are all well acquainted by now with the well-worn Soviet cliché of "control over disarmament, but no control over armaments." Most of us know by now that this slogan, if we analyse it, will not really solve our control problems. This is a very clever phrase, I admit, but after all what good is it to get into an argument over semantics and the meaning of words, about

(Mr. Dean, United States)

whether some measure involving the maintenance of agreed levels of forces and armaments is or is not a measure of disarmament. Instead, let us recognize, as the representative of the United Kingdom so eloquently urged at the twenty-ninth plenary meeting, that there is a real problem, at least in Western minds, both about verifying the implementation of the obligation to cut down to agreed levels and about discovering possible clandestine stockpiles of armaments or clandestinely maintained troop units.

We have said that we want assurance against such dangers, and Mr. Zorin has chosen to interpret the word "assurance" to mean that we are demanding 100 per cent inspection in the first stage for a 30 per cent reduction. I must say again that this is not correct. "Assurance" to us means reasonable or adequate assurance, not foolproof assurance -- which is never attainable anyway. If we were to ask for fool proof assurance we would never achieve general and complete disarmament. If we have a cut-back of 30 per cent we know that the risk from clandestinely retained stockpiles is not as great as it will be later, because 70 per cent of Western strength will remain.

Hence we are prepared to consider the possibility of having not full verification of reduced armaments but only spot and random checks involving only a relatively small part of Soviet territory for hidden armaments.

The so-called progressive zonal plan -- or whatever one wishes to call it -- properly worked out and agreed between us, is one attempt to achieve this. As I have said, we have an open mind on how we can achieve it. We think this progressive zonal plan is a promising plan -- or an interesting plan -- and we hope all members will explore it fully as we are doing. We are quite ready to consider any workable alternatives. Indeed, we will be very disappointed if our Soviet colleagues persist in denigrating this plan, but we do ask that if they finally reject it they do so honestly, without misrepresenting or distorting what the United States is proposing and that, if possible, they produce with an equally constructive plan.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

What I have said today has not been addressed to any one specific field of disarmament, and in this over-all perspective I have tried to avoid going into detail. Rather I have considered the basic problem of how it is possible to approach the drafting of a general and complete disarmament treaty. I have tried to connect the disarmament measures to the broader context of the world military situation and of the security needs of parties to the general and complete disarmament treaty. On all of these points, unfortunately, the Soviet and United States outlooks have thus far been considerably apart. I earnestly hope that this will not remain the case. Indeed we cannot have these views remaining so far apart if we are to succeed here in our task -- and we must succeed.

As all members know, my government does not in any sense consider that it knows all the answers on disarmament, that it has developed a "perfect" plan, or that we have all the know-how or all the brains. The first sign that we may be advancing towards our goal will come, it seems to me, when the Soviet Government acknowledges the same fact with regard to its plan. Then perhaps we can get somewhere. We are always reviewing and examining our proposals and the problems before us. We are trying to do this in a calm and objective way. We are trying to learn, and we have learned much, from our eight new colleagues here. We are very appreciative of the very real contributions that they have made to our thinking. I submit that if our Soviet colleagues will do likewise a turning point may be reached in our deliberations here. At any rate let us hope so.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I am very glad that the United States representative ended his statement on a fairly peaceful note, and that he has accepted some of the criticisms of the United States plan which have been made so far. He has, in fact, told us that the United States does not consider its plan to be perfect and that it is willing to accept any suggestions that may be made. It is, precisely, my intention to examine the great defects of the United States plan for general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We have reached a fairly advanced stage in our discussion on the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but I should like to make a few general comments on certain aspects of the United States document submitted on 18 April, more particularly because the whole of the discussion and all the explanations we have obtained so far confirm the fears we have felt from the outset regarding this document.

With your permission, let us begin with the title of the United States document and compare it with that of the Soviet draft. Whereas the draft submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) is entitled "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", document ENDC/30, submitted on 18 April by the United States, is entitled "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World".

I must apologise for repeating these titles with which we are all quite familiar; but the difference between them - I am now referring to the difference in the conception and wording of the two titles - will not, I think, have escaped the notice of anyone. Others have turned their attention to it before me, in particular Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, who referred to it in his statement of 2 May. Of course his comments on the subject, as we shall see, had a different purport. I merely wish to point out that Mr. Godber also drew attention to this difference in wording, according to which the United States document is an outline and the Soviet document a draft treaty. On this point Mr. Godber said:

"... but a document does not become a treaty just by calling it one; it does not become even a draft treaty just by calling it one". (ENDC/PV.29, p.5)

I understand from this that the United Kingdom representative does not want us to dwell on the words and that these titles are merely formal designations without any significance. In spite of our great desire to agree with Mr. Godber, we cannot share this point of view. We consider that the title of a document as important as those we are discussing here is not a mere label or insignificant designation. Far from being a mere matter of form the title is, in our view, something important. In a title, especially when it is fairly long, as in the case of the United States draft, the authors seek to express the purport, the whole substance of the document.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It may be true, as Mr. Godber says, that a document does not become a draft treaty simply because it is entitled "draft treaty". But it is none the less true that a text which the authors themselves are unwilling to call a draft treaty has even less chance of becoming one. The title of a document is binding. If that were not so, if the title of document ENDC/30 submitted by the United States delegation was of no importance, why was that document not called simply a draft treaty? What prevented the United States from giving it a precise title? What led the United States to avoid this necessary clarity with such evident care. What is the meaning of this deliberately chosen wording which refers to the "outline of basic provisions of a treaty" - as though there were to be several treaties - "on general and complete disarmament" - as though general and complete disarmament could have different forms and aspects?

We have no liking for semantics and I am sorry I have been obliged to revert to this point. But I think it is useful for our discussion to revert, even at this stage, to certain basic tendencies of the two documents under consideration. The reason why I have dwelt on the title of the United States document, is that it reveals this reticence of the United States in the face of the imperative needs of general and complete disarmament -- a reticence which, as was to be expected, is to be found at all stages of the United States text. It should also be noted that the two documents which ought to serve as a basis for our work of drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament, namely, the Soviet draft and the United States draft, are based on two entirely different ideas.

The Soviet draft is based on the idea that general and complete disarmament should be carried out now, in the world of today, that the process of general and complete disarmament should begin as soon as possible and be carried out in the shortest possible time, and that only general and complete disarmament can make it possible to ensure peace and the peaceful co-existence of States and peoples. According to this draft, general and complete disarmament should be begun and instituted in the world as it is at present -- a world made up of independent and sovereign States when the process of general and complete disarmament is completed. It is as armies and armaments gradually disappear that the world will be transformed into a peaceful world. Hence it is through

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

the elimination of armed forces and armaments that the Soviet draft provides for the creation of a peaceful world. That is the idea underlying the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union.

Thus, whereas the Soviet draft is based on the idea that it is through disarmament that the present world, with its insecurity and international tension, will be transformed into a peaceful world, the United States draft sets out from the idea that disarmament can only be carried out if our present world is pacified first. That is obvious, not only from the very title of the United States draft, but because it is a key idea of the document, rooted in its various articles and provisions.

As early as the discussion on the preamble and especially during the work of revising the two texts before us, as well as during the debate on the decision to be taken concerning the preamble, we disagreed with the United States proposal that general and complete disarmament should be carried out in a peaceful world. We also disagree with the text according to which States - meaning the States parties to the disarmament treaty - "have resolved to conclude the following treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control in a peaceful world". In clear and simple language, it seems to us that these complicated formulas merely confirm the fact that the United States is only willing to carry out general and complete disarmament "in a peaceful world", that is to say a world which has been pacified, and pacified in the American way.

It is true that in reading the articles of the United States draft it is difficult to form any precise and clear idea of the nature of the peaceful world in which the United States would be willing to sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament. But although the official representatives of the United States are silent on this point, American newspapers are rather more outspoken. A few days ago (ENDC/PV.26, p. 29) the Soviet representative quoted The New York World Telegram and Sun, according to which the United States, in submitting its proposal, had stated the price the world would have to pay if it wanted general and complete disarmament. That price, according to the newspaper, was the establishment of international institutions that would encourage States to abandon the greater part of their national sovereignty, recognition of the unquestioned and unrestricted jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, acceptance

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of supranational inspection and verification, and agreement to make national security dependent on an international peace force controlled by a substantially modified and strengthened United Nations.

Thus according to this newspaper, and in the estimation of certain United States circles, the world will have to pay a price if it wants general and complete disarmament, and that price will be the renunciation of part of their sovereignty by sovereign and independent States and their submission to bodies and institutions modelled by the United States as it sees fit.

But to have a peaceful world in order then, and only then, to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it is obvious that the main questions in dispute between States would have to be settled in the world of today - an over-armed world in which force and the threat of force have become the rule for certain Powers. Such an idea and such an attitude hardly lend themselves to any other interpretation than that they are prompted by the desire to have the questions in dispute settled in the presence of the existing armed forces and armaments, that is to say, under the threat of force, and only then to take any serious steps to carry out general and complete disarmament.

This impression, which is given even by the preamble that the United States delegation wishes to be embodied in a treaty on general and complete disarmament, is all the more justified and strengthened in that it also emerges very clearly from the wording of certain paragraphs of the United States draft concerning the international force for maintaining peace in a disarmed world.

Section H, paragraph 5(c), provides for the "conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments." (ENDC/30, page 18). It must therefore be concluded that this peace force envisaged in the United States draft would be completely independent of the Security Council, which is the only body able, under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, to constitute such a force and give it instructions and orders.

But is it possible to believe that the States represented at this Conference and the other sovereign and independent countries of the whole world would be prepared to accede to the wishes and intentions of the authors of the

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

United States draft and to renounce part of their national sovereignty, that is to say, to submit to a body constituted according to United States ideas and concepts, outside the Security Council? It is quite obvious that it is unrealistic to think we can accept provisions which conflict with national sovereignty and even with the independence of countries. Consequently, if we adopt the United States proposals, it will become impossible to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

That being so, one has the impression that the idea underlying the United States draft not only is not calculated to facilitate our work, but, on the contrary, seems specially designed to prevent us reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Various statements made here, and the remarks concerning the use of capital letters for the term United Nations Peace Force, make it clear that many countries are apprehensive about the intentions underlying the United States draft.

It appears that the United States draft was not prepared in order to lead, and would not lead, to an agreement on general and complete disarmament, but that, on the contrary, many of its provisions were drafted in such a way as to prevent us from concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the United States delegation does not wish this impression to remain with the other delegations, it must give us the necessary clarifications to correct it.

I should now like to consider another question in the same context. In the section entitled "Introduction" in the United States draft, it is stated that the treaty would enter into force upon ratification, but that "Stage II would begin when all militarily significant States had become Parties to the Treaty ...". (ENDC/30, p. 3). Thus Stage I of the United States treaty is so conceived that it is not necessary for all militarily significant States to agree to be parties to the treaty from the beginning. That immediately shows how little importance the United States attaches to the disarmament measures it proposes in Stage I. But if we consider the provision in the United States draft under which the transition from Stage I to Stage II could only take place with the agreement of all the permanent members of the Control Council, we also gain the impression that we might well never proceed from Stage I to Stage II at all.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

To us, it is inconceivable that militarily significant States might not be parties to the treaty from the outset. And if the United States delegation does not wish very serious doubt to subsist about the intentions of its draft on this point too, it must tell us how it proposes to conclude a treaty without the participation of all the "militarily significant States". It would also be interesting to know which are these States. Is it intended to proceed without France, which unfortunately is not at present taking part in the work of this Conference? Is a treaty to be concluded without the participation of Western Germany, which is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons by every possible means? Or is it proposed to exclude other militarily significant States from the treaty on general and complete disarmament? Is this the intention?

We think it will be necessary for the United States delegation to answer these questions, so that we can form a more accurate idea of the intentions of the authors of the United States draft.

It must accordingly be noted that the general impression created by all the provisions of the United States draft confirms our belief, for the time being at least, that this draft, based on the idea that the world must first be pacified in order to achieve general and complete disarmament afterwards, is not only wrong, but is also an abstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We have already expressed our views, during the discussions in this Committee, on the merits of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union; I should now like to examine in rather more detail certain questions concerning the Stage I of disarmament, as provided for in the Soviet draft and in the United States document.

The disarmament measures in Stage I of the Soviet draft are resigned to satisfy the requirements of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, they have the advantage of meeting present needs, in particular by effectively eliminating, as from the end of the first stage of disarmament, the danger and threat of a surprise attack and of a thermo-nuclear war.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We must not forget that in reality it is the danger of a nuclear war that is now causing anxiety to all the peoples of the world. This has been emphasized by the President of the United States, speaking at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, who said:

"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the date when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness." (A/PV.1013)

Many representatives have pointed out that the shorter the stages and the whole process of disarmament, the less will be the danger of creating a disequilibrium to the detriment of a country or group of countries, which is always possible while disarmament measures are being carried out. The Soviet draft, which sets a period of four years for carrying out the whole process of general and complete disarmament and eighteen months for completing the first stage, has the unquestionable advantage of reducing the consequences of any possible disequilibrium during the execution of disarmament measures. The great majority of delegations do not question the fact that there are considerable advantages in carrying out general and complete disarmament quickly. It has often been pointed out that once the programme of general and complete disarmament has been begun, this will make it possible to prevent any going back or reversal of the disarmament process.

A second conclusion to be drawn is this: the greater the reduction of armaments in the first stage, the smaller will be the risk of a conflagration started by some individual Power using the remaining armaments.

Whereas the Soviet draft offers undoubted advantages which would allow the world to feel more at ease and safe from surprise attacks and the outbreak of a nuclear war, the United States draft, at least in the first stage, does not include any real disarmament measures that could eliminate the danger of a nuclear war and contribute to effective reduction of the destructive power now possessed by the armed forces of the great Powers.

Our delegation has already had occasion, when speaking on 18 April during the discussion on the first articles of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.23 pp.16-25), to observe that the United States programme submitted last autumn, on the basis of which document ENDC/30 was drawn up, did not really contain, at least in its first stage, any measures that could contribute effectively to a real reduction in the destructive power of the great Powers, especially the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In the first of a series of statements he made to explain and defend his draft, the United States representative described the comment we had made on the United States programme as "somewhat bold", and went on to say:

"If my Bulgarian colleague does not consider that a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of armaments would contribute most substantially to the reduction of military potential, then we do indeed have very different ideas as to what constitutes disarmament." (ENDC/PV.26, p.7)

Mr. Dean's conclusion that our ideas on general and complete disarmament differ considerably is one of the few points on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative. With your permission I should like to explain why the draft and the proposals put forward by the United States would not contribute to effective reduction of the destructive power remaining at the disposal of the great Powers, especially the nuclear Powers, during and after completion of the first stage of general and complete disarmament -- as those proposals are formulated in the United States draft. This question is, moreover, of particular importance because, as several delegations have already pointed out during our discussions, under the provisions of the United States draft, which we have already examined, there would be no certainty of ever being able to pass on to the second stage of general and complete disarmament on completion of the first.

In the first place, the United States draft cannot contribute to reducing the destructive power of the nuclear States, because it does not include nuclear disarmament measures in its first stage. Despite the repeated claims of the United States delegation that one of the great merits of the American programme is that it provides for a beginning of nuclear disarmament in the first stage, it is perfectly obvious to any impartial observer that the transfer to peaceful purposes of fifty tons of fissionable material previously earmarked for military purposes cannot be regarded as a disarmament measure, any more than the cessation of production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. These measures provided for in the United States draft would not reduce the existing stocks of nuclear weapons in the slightest. On the contrary, with the large amounts of fissionable material they now possess, the great Powers would be able to manufacture new and greatly improved nuclear weapons, which would be more destructive.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Moreover, it is no mere coincidence that the Western Powers have been continuing their underground nuclear weapon tests for many months and that the United States and the United Kingdom have started their current series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean. Their purpose in setting off these explosions, as President Kennedy himself pointed out, is to secure a substantial improvement in nuclear weapons. For in his address of 2 March 1962 on nuclear testing and disarmament, President Kennedy said:

"This series is designed to lead to many important, if not always dramatic, results. Improving the nuclear yield per pound of weight in our weapons will make them easier to move" (ENDC/13, p.6)

Consequently, not only the United States, but in general any nuclear Power which possesses substantial quantities of fissionable materials destined for weapons production, would not be obliged by measures such as those provided for in the United States draft to reduce its stocks of nuclear weapons, but could increase them as and when the nuclear tests these Powers are carrying out provide information showing how to double, triple or still further increase the destructive power of its nuclear weapons with the same quantity of fissionable material and the same specific weight.

The United States proposals also provide for a global reduction of conventional armaments and nuclear weapon vehicles by 30 per cent during the first stage, or ten per cent each year for a period of three years. Let us leave aside this whittling down of the reduction from 30 per cent to 20 and then to 10 and consider what this proportion of 30 per cent represents. Mr. Dean claims that this reduction would contribute substantially to reducing the destructive power of the armed forces of States, and especially of the nuclear Powers. In support of this claim, a great wealth of detail has been furnished, mostly of a technical nature, concerning the categories and types of weapons that would be eliminated as a result of the 30 per cent reduction. But the essential questions are these: Does this 30 per cent reduction constitute real disarmament? Will it contribute effectively to reducing the destructive power of the armaments of the different States? And will it, consequently, reduce the danger of another war, which this time would be a nuclear war?

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Allow me to remind you, first of all, that this proposal has been made at a time when there is a certain level of armaments and armed forces, and a certain well-defined destructive power of the armaments of States. In our considerations we have always had the existing destructive power in mind and we are bound to start from the existing levels of armed forces and armaments.

Now as I have already pointed out today, owing to the rapid progress of military technology, nuclear weapons are currently acquiring much greater destructive power - in some cases several times greater per unit of weight. That was confirmed in President Kennedy's address. If there were still the slightest doubt on this point, it would be sufficient to refer once again to so competent an authority as the President of the United States who, in his address of 2 March 1962, explained that one of the main purposes of these tests was to develop war-heads of low weight in relation to the destructive power of their thermo-nuclear content. Now it is obvious that throughout the first stage military technology would continue to develop at an increasing rate, since no restriction is placed on it during the period for carrying out the first stage, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.

In reality it is the destructive power of nuclear weapons which is important now - and which will increase by several times - not the reduction in various categories of conventional armaments and delivery vehicles during Stage I of the United States plan, which is relatively insignificant compared with that increase.

As regards the destructive power of nuclear weapons, radical measures have recently been taken by the United States to improve their existing stocks. If further evidence is needed, it was provided a few days ago by the New York Times which reported, on the basis of information from the Pentagon, that "President Kennedy has directed the military to cut back its orders for nuclear warheads by several thousands". The article went on to say:

"Presumably, the President's action was taken partly because the nation already possesses more than enough nuclear weapons of certain types." But this is certainly only one of the reasons why the decision was taken. The other reason, doubtless a more important one, is that after the nuclear tests, improved nuclear weapons will be produced with a much greater destructive power per unit of weight. Then the military will be able to supply their needs by ordering improved warheads.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is therefore more than likely -- it is even obvious -- that with the 70 per cent of the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which, under the United States plan, the nuclear Powers will possess at the end of Stage I, the destructive power of their striking force will not only be maintained, but will be greatly increased as compared with the present level. And I have not taken into consideration here the fact that the improvement of nuclear weapons might make it possible for some purely conventional existing armaments, which have not yet been used to deliver nuclear weapons, to be adapted for use as projectiles with atomic warheads.

It may be useful to recall here that on 8 December 1953, Mr. Eisenhower, speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations, said that "atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services". (470th plenary meeting, para. 89).

It will therefore be no comfort to anyone to know that the nuclear threat hanging over his head -- that sword of Damocles mentioned by President Kennedy, which will have a far greater destructive power than before --- will be carried by only 70 per cent of the existing nuclear weapon vehicles and not by 100 per cent. The destructive power will not be smaller, but greater.

As opposed to the United States plan, which leaves the nuclear threat hanging over mankind not only during the first stage, but for the whole period of disarmament, the proposals contained in the Soviet draft treaty, which provide for the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and the simultaneous dismantling of bases on foreign soil in the first stage of disarmament, would lead to the effective neutralization and total immobilization of nuclear weapons.

I do not intend to go into the question of military bases on foreign territory here, although it is directly connected with the question of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons. I reserve the right to revert to this question, since the problem of dismantling foreign bases is of great importance for my country. When I do so, I shall make a few comments on the statement made today by the United States representative. But it should be stressed at once that that statement presented some curious aspects and a completely incomprehensible conception of the way to carry out general and complete disarmament and, especially, of the way to reduce tension and create an atmosphere of trust between countries and peoples.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I shall not discuss the important question of control over disarmament measures either, for I hope to have an opportunity of reverting to them, and more especially to control measures in the first stage, later in the discussion.

The conclusion that must be drawn from a comparison of the Stage I provisions of the Soviet draft treaty and those of the United States document is that the State I, as formulated in the Soviet draft, includes radical and decisive disarmament measures, by which genuine disarmament could be achieved from the outset and the threat of a nuclear war and, above all, of a surprise attack, could be eliminated in practice from the end of the Stage I.

The measures included in the Stage I of the United States plan, on the other hand, not only do not make it possible to start disarmament quickly, but also leave the full threat of a nuclear war and a surprise attack hanging over the world.

This difference in substance between the two drafts brings us back again to the different conceptions on which they are based and to which I referred at the beginning of my statement today. A large number of weaknesses and shortcomings in Stage I also derive from the erroneous conception on which the United States document is based. I hope that as various points in the two plans are clarified, the United States representative will find it possible to approximate his programme to the specific requirements of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles adopted on 20 September 1961, which refers to real disarmament measures to be taken as quickly as possible.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): The Swedish delegation has carefully studied the two drafts or outlines of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and has also listened with the greatest interest to the comments made by their sponsors on both their own proposals and the other party's proposals. We have also been most interested in the comments made by other delegations from both the non-aligned and the aligned countries.

It is obvious to everyone, as Mr. Burns said the other day, that although both proposals have the same starting point, namely, the Agreed Principles, and the same final aim, namely general and complete disarmament, the solutions are very different, and that there is a considerable lack of understanding between the sponsors both with regard to what is actually meant by the proposals in the drafts and with regard to the motives behind them.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

At this juncture it would be presumptuous for me to try and put forward any proposals for compromises in one respect or the other. But I feel strongly that some of the lack of understanding stems from lack of clarification in the drafts and in the comments on them. This is not a criticism of obscurity in writing or speaking; it is only meant to show what an utterly complex problem we are dealing with. Today I will only try to touch upon a few sectors of our problem on which I find that more clarification would do a lot of good.

My first point concerns the problem of confidence. Several speakers have said that confidence is fundamental to any disarmament measure. When I heard Mr. Burns reminding us that we all start out from the same point and must meet at the same point, I could not help thinking of the personal problem that we all have when we have to decide what means to use to travel from "A" to "B"; for instance, from Europe to America. The choice depends so much on confidence in the carrier and on how much of a hurry you are in. Fifteen years ago you had to be in a great hurry to have confidence in an aeroplane for your Atlantic crossing; otherwise you preferred a slow boat. Nowadays hardly anybody considers the personal risks connected with air travel when choosing between air or sea.

I would submit that disarmament at the present time is even less developed than Atlantic air crossings fifteen years ago. But as surely as confidence grew in the aeroplane, confidence in disarmament will grow once we have started to disarm and realize that the other fellow is also doing it. This, however, cannot be achieved without taking some risks. One hundred per cent security is hardly attainable. Judging from experience in other walks of life, it is advisable to start comparatively slowly and then gradually increase speed as you gather momentum or, in this case, confidence.

This leads me to my first question. Would it not be worth considering, for example, making the time period for the first disarmament stage a little longer than in the Soviet proposal, and making the periods of the second and third stages a little shorter than in the United States proposal? Could we at least have a more specific explanation from the Soviet delegation of how it could achieve so much in so short a time, and one from the United States delegation of why it cannot go faster after stage I?

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Before I leave the subject of confidence, I merely want to add that I am fully aware that its existence or non-existence is related not only to disarmament measures but also to the political tension which may exist at a given time. But we are here to speak of disarmament and not of how it could be facilitated by a general relaxation in political tension.

My next point is that of military balance. We are all aware of point 5 of the Agreed Principles, which lays down that at no stage should any State or group of States gain military advantage and thus offset the balance.

Now what indeed is military balance? Is it a state of equilibrium in case of war, so that neither side could be sure of a victorious result? Or is a state of affairs in which each side would know that even a so-called victory in war would have a disastrous result?

I would submit that there is no such thing as a mathematical military balance, and I think history has proved this view to be right. Therefore, my second definition seems to be more valid in the present world. If that is so, my second question arises, namely: is it not worth considering whether the exact percentagewise reduction of armaments by categories or types, as in the United States proposal, would really uphold the so-called balance better than, say, a higher reduction in some armaments such as atomic weapons or weapon carriers and a lower one in others? Also, knowing that wars fought with conventional arms have been full of horrors and tremendous loss of life -- as, for instance, in the Soviet Union during World War II -- would it not be worth considering a higher reduction of conventional armaments such as tanks than is envisaged in the Soviet proposal for stage I? To a country which has a land frontier in common with another country that has a concentration of tanks near the same frontier, such a potential for a conventional attack may seem nearly as disquieting as a potential for a nuclear attack.

To enable us newcomers to understand better the meaning of the word "balance" as used in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, it would be of considerable interest to hear from the two sides how they would define this term and how, in accordance with this definition, they feel they have implemented this principles in detail in their drafts.

(Mr Edberg, Sweden)

I hope my colleagues will bear with me if I put forward some more questions. I have found myself in full agreement with representatives who, more often than not, have begun their statements by a declaration that they have "listened with interest" to the statements made and have promised to "ponder over them carefully", but have still been unable to grasp the full significance of some of the proposals. In particular, I have not been entirely clear about the ideas on verification and control of disarmament measures put forward by the two sides.

I think it would be helpful to have even more detailed explanations of the very interesting proposal for a zonal inspection system. We have, on the one hand, the declared United States intention that zonal inspection aims at extending only gradually over the surface of the countries that disarm, so as not to aim at more inspection than is said to correspond to reduction in armaments.

As we understand it, this correspondence between inspection and disarmament is not absolute and exact. Thirty per cent disarmament does not necessarily entail full inspection of exactly 30 per cent of the territory. It means, if we are not mistaken, that a small degree of disarmament will be subjected to full inspection of a limited area of the territory, while ensuing greater degrees of disarmament will have to be controlled by full inspection of a larger area of the territory; and complete disarmament would be controlled by inspection of the whole territory. On the other hand, we have the Soviet impression that the zonal inspection system involves the opening up of territories for foreign controllers before the process of disarmament begins.

This leads me to my third question; would it not be possible, in the view of the Soviet delegation, so to construe a zonal system along the suggested lines that there would in its opinion be a significant difference between the opening up for control of a limited area and the opening up for control of a whole territory? In this connexion, would it not be of a certain importance for military security that the deployment of forces and arms in uninspected zones would remain unknown to all outsiders?

This also leads me to my fourth question --- which has already been touched upon by Mr. Atta, who said that, while there is no point in verifying what remains after a 5 per cent cut, what remains after a significant cut of, for instance, 30 or 40 per cent is important, and that the question of non-inspection

(Mr. Edborg, Sweden)

of the remaining arms before reaching a significant amount would be a matter for discussion. My question is this: would it be possible, in the view of the United States delegation, to defer declarations as to each particular zone, and inspection too, during the first stage until a significant cut had already been effected? If so, what, in the opinion of the United States delegation, would be a significant cut?

Now if I may further discuss aspects of the zonal inspection plan, it is stated in section G, article 3.c. (3) of the United States draft that:

"The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it." (ENDC/30, p.14)

That the party a zone of whose territory is to be inspected is not itself to be allowed to pick the zone is understandable, for otherwise it might well pick a zone in which it had perhaps declared no reduction at all or which, for some reason, was militarily insignificant. On the other hand, if the selection is to be left to the other parties to the treaty, and perhaps, if I may say so, to the "opposite" side, would it not be possible for them at the moment of the first selection to select a zone for inspection which, for various reasons, they suspected of containing the most important military bases and armaments in that country, and thereby lay bare important information regarding armaments before much disarmament had yet been effected?

The representative of India, Mr. Lall, felt that the zonal inspection plan was a bit like a game of chance, and he said he had no objection to that. The representative of Nigeria, in his interesting statement on 4 May, suggested that a further close study should be devoted to the proposal for zonal inspection or similar proposals. In this connexion he said:

"The more it is a game of chance the more confidence it will generate."

(ENDC/PV.31, p.9)

There may well be merit in this observation.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

This leads me to my fifth question: Would it be possible, in the view of the United States delegation, to arrange the selection of zones for inspection not, as suggested in the United States plan, by parties to the treaty but rather, as Mr. Lall described it, by pulling something out of a hat? Would this be a possible way of avoiding the possible risk that selection by the parties would result, so to speak, in choices that were too good?

The zonal inspection system also contains a most interesting feature, namely, the self-declaration of the level of armament in each zone. Such a declaration would constitute a considerable deviation from traditional policies on military secrecy and security, at least in many countries. An undertaking to give such a declaration would evidence a certain belief in the will of other Powers to honour the treaty. As such it could be a confidence-creating factor of great value.

When pondering the control systems as they appear to me in the two documents, I cannot help making a comparison between disarmament control and the customs control at a national border. Usually the customs officer wants to know from the traveller, even if he has a diplomatic passport, whether he has any articles subject to duty. If we draw the parallel with the control system suggested by the United States, the customs officer would ask the traveller to declare the articles subject to duty that he had in each suitcase. He would then select at random one of the suitcases and say, "Let me have a good look at the contents of that suitcase. Maybe I shall find something there which is not in your declaration." The rest of the suitcases he would leave alone. Again, under the system suggested by the Soviet Union as I interpret it, the customs officer would say, "Let me see all the goods that you have which are subject to duty, so that I can estimate their correct value". The traveller produces these articles, and the customs officer does not even look into the remaining contents of the suitcases, or in suitcases from which no goods have been produced. Now one may have different opinions as to which customs system is to be preferred. The traveller and the representatives of governments may, for instance, take very different views of the two systems.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

It would be of interest to hear -- and this is my sixth question, which is directed to all of us -- if the principle of self-declaration would raise any insurmountable difficulties of military security. More specifically, the problem is, how important is secrecy concerning quantity as compared with secrecy concerning deployment?

Furthermore, we have heard from the Soviet delegation that 100 per cent disarmament -- for instance, of nuclear weapon delivery means -- would be accompanied by 100 per cent inspection. In order to form an opinion on this offer, we would be interested to hear in more detail how this 100 per cent inspection would be operated. So I come to my seventh question: when, during stage I, would the inspection system start to operate? Would it be from the very beginning? And where would the inspection take place? Would it be on the place where units and armaments were located, or would it be at special depots at which units to be disbanded and armaments to be destroyed were to be concentrated.

I now have a few words to say about armed force levels. Both drafts have figures on intended levels of armed forces. The United States document explains in detail what sort of personnel the reduction is aimed at, whereas the Soviet draft has no such provision. I wish my colleagues to pay attention to the fact that the personnel build-up of armed forces is made in accordance with entirely different principles in different countries. On the one hand we have countries like my own that have a rather limited cadre of regular personnel, particularly in the army, which is used to train the conscripts and reserves who, after having completed their training, are sent back home. Under such a system the army cannot develop its full strength until after a call-up of the field units. On the other hand, under another system -- such as that used, for instance in Canada -- all the forces consist of regulars, who are true professionals. Obviously, the impact of a reduction in numbers of regular personnel would be much stronger, and would be felt more rapidly, under a system built on conscripts and reserves, because it might lose its core, than in a system built on professionals only. On the other hand, a reduction of non-regular personnel on duty would be felt comparatively little under the conscript system and would not mean much as a reduction of the fighting capability.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

From this point of view, it would be interesting to hear -- and this is my question number 8 -- what sort of personnel reduction is aimed at in the Soviet proposal. Does the reduction include both regulars and conscripts and, if so, in the same proportion between these two categories as in a field unit?

Although the United States plan is more developed on this point, it would also be of interest to hear how the United States delegation views the problem of selection of units to be reduced. Would it be a reduction across the board of the military organization or would it give room for cutting more of the tail than of the teeth?

My next problem concerns the so-called foreign bases. The Soviet proposal lays considerable stress on the necessity to eliminate foreign bases, because it views them as particularly menacing and endangering the peace. However, it may be asked whether some national military bases in one country could not be regarded as equally menacing to the security of a neighbouring country. An imaginary country may, it seems, feel as insecure because of such neighbouring national bases as another country may feel embarrassed by what have been termed foreign bases. This is actually a result of geography, history and the political situation of today.

This brings me to my ninth question: it would be interesting to hear from the Soviet delegation whether similar considerations should not apply to the geographical location of some bases as to the nationality of some other bases.

Equally, it would be interesting to hear more about the United States approach as to how the zonal system would be applied to the foreign bases.

My next question concerns nuclear weapon carriers. In the Soviet draft all nuclear weapon carriers will be eliminated in stage I, while in the United States draft the nuclear weapon carriers will be reduced gradually and on percentage-wise.

Now, what is a nuclear weapon carrier? As Mr. Burns pointed out the other day, many types of ships and airplanes, indeed nearly all, could be potential weapon carriers. In the Soviet draft there is a definition of nuclear weapon carriers which I understand to take into consideration only those rockets, ships, airplanes and so on which are actually built and equipped for carrying nuclear weapons, whereas the potential weapon carriers referred to by Mr. Burns are not mentioned. I have the feeling, although my delegation has no access to atomic

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secrets, that the modifying of any ship or airplane into an atomic weapon carrier is a fairly complex technical process which cannot be accomplished in a hurry. If that is so, perhaps the reduction of actually existing nuclear weapon carriers as defined both in the Soviet and in the United States plan will have to suffice as a disarmament measure. A complete elimination of all potential nuclear weapon carriers seems to be preactically impossible to effectuate. If the existing military nuclear weapon carriers were to be eliminated, either as in the Soviet plan at an early date or as in the United States plan more gradually, this elimination would result in a most considerable reduction in fighting capacity.

It would be interesting to hear, however -- and this is my tenth question -- how the two sides would more closely define nuclear weapon carriers. We were told by Mr. Zorin:

"... as regards verification of the 100 per cent reduction or elimination of means of delivery, we agree to such verification throughout the territory of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.31, p.50)

The implication of this statement and the Soviet plan on this point has perhaps not been clearly understood and may even now not be entirely clear. Different interpretations on this point have, it seems, been offered by various speakers in the course of the debate, and my eleventh question would be to ask Mr. Zorin for a further clarification on this point.

My twelfth and last question concerns chemical and biological weapons. These weapons are, to my mind, rightly included in the term "weapons of mass destruction", and their existence implies a capability for war of a most sinister type. However, in neither of the two documents before us is the elimination of these weapons envisaged until stage II. I would submit that there could be good reasons for reduction or elimination of these weapons, also, already in stage I, although I realize that the control of such a measure could be difficult in practice. It would be interesting to hear from both sides some comments as to the timing of their disarmament measures with regard to the chemical and biological arsenal.

It is said that, while some people find solutions for every difficulty, others find difficulties in every solution. I hope that my numerous questions today have not put me in the second category. We are all painfully aware that the problem of general and complete disarmament is an immensely complex one. My remarks and questions today must not be interpreted in any way as a criticism of the two plans that have been submitted to us. My delegation is keenly aware of the goodwill

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and the sincere intentions that lie behind both of them, as it is aware of the tremendous amount of work and thought that have gone into them. We are appreciative of the results that have been achieved by these efforts, and our only desire is to contribute to even greater clarification and a rapprochement which we hope will result in one single draft.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I have listened with great interest -- to use the formula which the representative of Sweden said nearly everybody uses -- to the questions which he has put to the sponsors of the two plans before us. I feel that in answering those questions the sponsors of the plans could help to clear up many points which at present must be obscure not only to the delegations of the non-committed countries represented here but to many of us who have been associated a rather longer time with disarmament negotiations. I was particularly interested in his seventh to tenth questions, inclusive, which related to the removal of the threat of nuclear war and the measures for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles. It is on this subject that I myself wish to speak today.

I am grateful to the representative of the Soviet Union for the answers that he gave at, I believe, the thirtieth and thirty-first meetings to some of the questions I had raised. The purpose of those questions, and of the further comments which I shall make today, is to clarify how the very difficult problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles is to be solved. What we have to determine here is whether we shall eliminate them all at one stroke, as the Soviet Union plan stipulates, or by degress, as the United States plan proposes. And we shall have to agree upon acceptable procedures for verification before we can decide on what measures we shall finally adopt to eliminate these nuclear weapon vehicles.

I should like now to refer to the explanation given by the representative of the Soviet Union of what was meant by Mr. Khrushchev's offer to agree to Western proposals for control if the West agrees to the Soviet Union proposals for disarmament. At the thirty-first meeting of the Conference, Mr. Zorin stated:

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"... if the Western Powers accept the Soviet plan for disarmament with all its wide and thorough-going measures, with all their consequences, we will give carte blanche to the Western Powers to work out measures of control over each of these disarmament measures. They will be free to work out and to propose such measures of control over disarmament as they believe to be necessary. It is self-evident that these must be measures of control over disarmament and not control over armaments. In other words control must correspond to the disarmament measures." (ENDC/PV.31, p. 40)

This is a fairly clear explanation, but I must say, speaking for the Canadian delegation, that we do not find that the offer, so explained, is a very attractive one. For what does the proposal amount to? It amounts to this: "You must proceed to disarm exactly as the Soviet Union draft treaty lays down, and we shall then agree to the measures of control which you propose." But as all delegations here have by now come to know very well, the West does not agree with the way in which the Soviet Union proposes to carry out disarmament for several other reasons besides those that we have given in criticism of its inadequate provisions for control. The statements made by the representatives of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States at our thirty-third meeting pointed out some of the aspects of the Soviet draft treaty which are not acceptable to the West.

I think we really do not need to spend any more time discussing this very generalized proposal of Mr. Khrushchev; we would be better advised to examine the specific measures of verification required for each measure of disarmament. In fact, what I was trying to do in my remarks at the twenty-sixth and thirtieth meetings of the Conference was to examine the control that would be required in connexion with the Soviet Union proposal for 100 per cent abolition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons in stage I. The representative of the Soviet Union seems to have somewhat misunderstood what I was trying to say, to judge from his remarks as they appear in the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.31, pp. 39-40). I was well aware that the Soviet proposal for the abolition of nuclear vehicles should be considered in the framework of the other proposals of the Soviet Union for the first stage. The Canadian delegation also realizes that as we develop our ideas of the verification required for the separate measures in the various stages, we shall find that the procedures of verification may tie in with one another and that the inspectors, in carrying out their functions, may be verifying more than one disarmament measure.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I should now like to refer to the comments which the representative of the Soviet Union made with regard to my intervention at the thirtieth meeting of the Conference. Mr. Zorin said:

"Mr. Dean said he is not sure that the Soviet Union is willing to permit 100 per cent verification even at the end of disarmament. But we tell you that if you agree to 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles we will agree to 100 per cent control over this. Why do you not trust us?" (ENDC/PV.30, p. 48)

This last rhetorical question, "Why do you not trust us", can, I think, best be replied to by quoting other words used by Mr. Zorin at the twenty-ninth meeting of the Conference, namely:

"A serious approach to the question of control necessitates taking into account the whole military and political situation and the relations existing among States: that is to say, whether there is the necessary degree of confidence among them or not." (ENDC/PV.29, p.37)

Unfortunately, it is one of the facts of life, of the present world situation, that there is anything but confidence between the Soviet Union and its allies, on the one side, and the NATO alliance, on the other. Anyone who has sat in these meetings will not need to be reminded of this.

Is it Mr. Zorin's belief that with the signing of a disarmament treaty 100 per cent confidence will be established? I do not imagine he would claim this. Otherwise why should we carry out disarmament in stages at all? I would again refer to his remark, which I have quoted several times, that the Soviet Union does not propose to take anything on trust in the execution of a disarmament treaty, and similarly does not expect others to take its compliance with disarmament on trust. Therefore, before there could be 100 per cent destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles, there would have to be 100 per cent certainty that no nuclear delivery vehicles, not even a few, could be concealed by anyone and escape destruction. This point was referred to by Sir Michael Wright at the thirty-third meeting of the Conference when he said:

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"The question, therefore, is whether the 100 per cent inspection spoken of by Mr. Zorin would include verification that there are no weapons hidden 'under the jacket'. If it does include this, an important avenue of progress is opened up. If it does not include this, the problem remains with us down over conventional forces and arms levels and over nuclear delivery vehicles."

(ENDC/PV.33, p.29)

Let us always keep in mind that what we are dealing with here are not tanks, or fighter aircraft, or cannon, or any of those arms of which a few could escape detection without making any crucial difference, but with nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, a single one of which can destroy the greatest city on earth and millions of its inhabitants. I submit that no responsible statesman would be willing to trust to the good faith of the other side that it was not hiding a few such weapons "under the jacket". Therefore we cannot take the attitude that the control would not need to be precise if 100 per cent abolition of nuclear carriers within the first stage were contemplated. If only a few nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them remained, we should be in a position analagous to 1945 and the succeeding years when there was a one-nation monopoly of the means of waging atomic war.

Mr. Zorin also said that he failed to see the logic of my argument that the danger of surprise attack would still exist even if nuclear delivery vehicles were supposed to be reduced by 100 per cent. He said:

"... if nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are reduced by 10 or 30 per cent, the risk of surprise attack in these circumstances will obviously be ten or at least three times greater than if all delivery vehicles were eliminated. This conclusion is absolutely logical. If you reduce delivery vehicles by 10 per cent, 90 per cent of delivery vehicles remain, which means that, to say the least, the possibility of an attack will be ten times greater than if you reduce delivery vehicles by 100 per cent, when you actually eliminate the possibility of attack. (ENDC/PV.30, p. 43)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The mathematics which Mr. Zorin employed there are, I suppose, illustrative, and his statement may seem to be logical, but I submit that in this disarmament process we must take account of the psychological as well as of the logical, and there is a considerable "if" in the last two sentences which I have quoted from Mr. Zorin; that is, "if" you eliminate them altogether. It is an obvious conclusion that if there were no vehicles there could be no surprise attack, but the problem really is to be sure that in fact no vehicles remain.

Let us consider in realistic terms what prevents any kind of nuclear attack in the world today. It is the knowledge of each side that if it unleashed a nuclear war it would bring upon itself a terrible retaliation by the nuclear armaments of the other side. The problem we have before us is to escape from this balance of terror, as it is called, and reach a climate of international relations such that the two sides have so much confidence in each other's good intentions they do not believe that there is any likelihood of their attempting to use nuclear weapons against each other under any circumstances; and then the last nuclear weapons vehicles can be eliminated. In other words, we have an exercise in confidence-building, which must accompany disarmament. As the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Atta, said in his statement at our thirty-first meeting -- and I take the liberty of quoting again what has been quoted with approval by many others:

"... my delegation believes that verification, confidence-building measures and disarmament are one and the same thing. These three elements must rise or fall together. Total verification, total disarmament and total confidence-generating measures are one and the same." (ENDC/PV.31, p.6)

As arms are reduced, confidence in the peaceful intentions of either side will increase. Therefore, can we expect to move from great distrust to 100 per cent confidence in a short period of time? As President Segni, of Italy, said when he spoke here as Foreign Minister on 28 March, of "the wall of misunderstanding that separates us". (ENDC/C.1/PV.1, p.11) This wall will not be removed by the wave of a wand or the stroke of a pen or by some form of words. This wall of distrust will have to be removed gradually by specific acts of disarmament, verified, enabling the confidence between the two sides as to their peaceful intentions to grow as armaments decrease.

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The threat of nuclear attack is not proportional to the absolute level of nuclear vehicles, but it would increase if there were an imbalance between those possessed by the one side and those possessed by the other. That is to say, if the nuclear weapons and vehicles of both sides are in balance, as by and large they are today, they know that neither one can undertake such an attack without suffering an unsustainable counter-blow. The danger would arise if one side could acquire sufficient superiority over the other to justify a surprise attack in the opinion of some of the "wild men" whose reported statements from time to time make us shudder. This could more easily occur when nuclear weapons vehicles are at a low level. For example, if one side had no nuclear vehicles, while the other had half a dozen intercontinental rockets which could threaten to destroy five or six of its opponent's greatest cities, there would be the opportunity for what has come to be known as "nuclear blackmail".

For all these reasons the arithmetical argument that there would be ten times the danger of surprise attack if you reduced by 10 per cent than if you reduced by 100 per cent is not, I respectfully submit, a true and valid argument.

I think it is apposite to mention again that stage I of the Soviet draft treaty makes no provision for the reduction of nuclear weapons, and that the possibility of their delivery by means other than a specialized rockets and aircraft would still exist.

My conclusions in this respect were challenged by the representative of Poland. To avoid taking up time I shall not reply to him now, although I could do so later if desired.

At our thirty-first meeting, Mr. Zorin, in answer to questions by the representative of the United Kingdom, said:

"I answered you yesterday and I answer you today: as regards verification of the 100 per cent reduction or elimination of the means of delivery, we agree to such verification throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. What more do you need? ... I am telling you that we agree to 100 per cent verification, and I add: 100 per cent throughout the territory of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.31, p.50)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Speaking for the Canadian delegation, and with great respect, we do think something more is needed, and that is an explanation of how the Soviet Union, in its plans for disarmament and verification in this respect, is going to relate in time the destruction of the vehicles with the necessary inspection and verification, which Mr. Zorin has now told us, in a statement which we regard as encouraging, will extend over all the territory of the Soviet Union.

I do not wish to bore the Committee with the argument and questions which I put forward at our thirtieth meeting, but I would like to repeat something that I then said, namely:

"Now let us try to understand how the Soviet Union is going to convince the West, and how the West is going to convince the Soviet Union, that all inter-continental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons will be destroyed at a given time." (ENDC/PV.30,p.9)

I went on to elaborate what would be necessary there, and I said it is suggested that these things would probably be collected somewhere or other and that their destruction should be watched when it takes place by inspectors. I went on:

"... how is the West to know that other rockets or other delivery vehicles are not hidden somewhere in the great spaces of the Soviet Union? And how is the Soviet Union to know that a number of delivery vehicles which belong to the Western Powers are not concealed somewhere? Would the Soviet Union be willing to let international inspectors visit every part of its territory to ensure that nothing existed outside the declared sites; and, if so, when would this be done? ... If all Soviet nuclear vehicles were at locations known to the international disarmament organization, and hence known to the West, would this not create the situation which the Soviet Union professes to fear -- that is, the West's being in possession of intelligence which would enable it to carry out a surprise nuclear assault to destroy the Soviet Union's nuclear deterrent capacity?" (ENDC/PV.30, pp.10-11)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Those are the questions which I asked previously and to which, I do not believe, we have received clear answers. I really cannot understand how this is going to work out. Does the representative of the Soviet Union mean that once the countries of the West put their signatures to a treaty of general and complete disarmament, embodying the Soviet 100 per cent nuclear weapons vehicle reduction in the first stage, the Soviet Union will immediately have such great confidence in their good intentions that it will be ready to let everything in the way of defence and armaments in the Soviet territory be seen by international inspectors -- who, according to what we have been hearing in other connexions, will inevitably include a lot of spies? And will this be allowed to happen while the West's means of nuclear weapons delivery are still in existence? Mr. Zorin must know that the West will not destroy 100 per cent of its nuclear weapons vehicles until it is quite certain that no Soviet nuclear weapon delivery vehicles remain concealed anywhere.

If Mr. Zorin should tell us that in the circumstances described -- that is, if a treaty with the Soviet for 100 per cent elimination in the first stage was signed -- the Soviet Union would be willing to display such great trust and confidence in the West, it would be very surprising considering the dark view which he takes of the possibility of a surprise attack under conditions when each side has reduced its means of delivery only 10 per cent, 20 per cent or 30 per cent and opened up only 10 per cent, 20 per cent or 30 per cent of its territory and armaments to inspection.

Any way out of this dilemma which the Soviet Union may propose, or any explanation of how, in its plans for disarmament, it expects to escape from the dilemma, must necessarily involve the time factor; the time factor must be explained. The dismantling, demolition and verification cannot all be done instantaneously. How, therefore, does the Soviet Union propose to relate in time the acts of destruction of vehicles and of verification so that no disparity or imbalance or threat to the security of any of the countries will exist at any time, and so that at the end no nuclear weapons vehicles at all will remain? Let us have something quite specific about the time period in which this will be effected.

The view of the Western nations here is that this problem can be solved only by a reduction of these weapons step by step and stage by stage. Some

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delegations here have contrasted unfavourably the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage with the Soviet proposal for a 100 per cent reduction. I have asked some questions in this intervention that, in the view of the Canadian delegation, must be answered satisfactorily if we are to believe that a 100 per cent reduction in the first stage is practicable. Let us think, on the other hand, what the effect would be if there could be an agreement between the two sides here on a staged reduction, with 30 per cent of nuclear weapons vehicles to be eliminated in about three years and the rest in a few years more. Such an agreement, although it does not sound as big as the 100 per cent reduction, would announce the end of the arms race, and it would begin the building of confidence between the two sides which is essential if the goal of 100 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons vehicles and the other measures constituting general and complete disarmament is to be reached. I would suggest that the effect on the world of an announcement by this Conference that it had agreed on a way to start the elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles and put an end to the arms race would be to create a tremendous upsurge of hope all over the world. And such an agreement is possible.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today many substantive considerations have been put forward by a number of delegations. These considerations obviously need to be closely studied. A number of questions were put which also need to be studied. It is not my intention to reply today to all of the considerations and questions that have been put forward. We shall do that subsequently in the course of our discussions.

Today I should like to draw your attention to certain consideration which were put forward by the Western delegations at one of our recent meetings, namely on 8 May.

At the meeting on 8 May we heard statements by a number of Western delegations, and I reserved the right to reply to these statements, especially the part which concerned the Soviet Union's position and the proposals which the Soviet Government submitted for consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Today the Soviet delegation intends to express its views in connexion with the questions raised in these statements.

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If we look for what the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy have in common, we can say that on the whole they concern three questions: first, the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories; secondly, the force levels to be laid down for the first stage of disarmament and lastly, control over disarmament measures.

I shall first dwell on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories. The statements of the representatives of the Western Powers were designed to justify the retention of military bases in the territories of other States. What were the basic arguments put forward in this connexion? In effect, three arguments were adduced. First, it was asserted that the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories would be tantamount to upsetting the existing military balance to the prejudice of the Western Powers in the course of carrying out disarmament. Secondly, the argument was advanced that the elimination of foreign military bases would be tantamount to repudiating co-operation between the Western Powers, to which, of course, they could not agree. Thirdly, the idea was advanced of the alleged equality between foreign bases in alien territories and national military bases.

There are no grounds whatever for the assertion that the elimination of foreign military bases simultaneously with the complete elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons would upset the existing balance to the advantage of the Soviet Union and to the prejudice of the Western powers. Have you really thought over the question of what advantages the Soviet Union could gain from the implementation of these measures? The Western delegations tried to defend the idea that the implementation of the measures laid down for the first stage in the Soviet draft treaty would open up opportunities for an attack on the Western Powers. Although this idea is utterly absurd and the history of our time has clearly shown that if an attack is to be feared from any quarter, it would be from the West and not from the Soviet Union. However, let us admit even this preposterous idea in order to analyse the reasonings of our opponents. What means could the Soviet Union use for such an alleged attack?

I think that not only military experts but all diplomats know that nowadays the main offensive weapon for a big war is the nuclear weapon. Under the Soviet draft treaty, however, this weapon would be neutralized as early as the first stage of disarmament as a result of the elimination of the means of delivery of

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nuclear weapons. Nuclear bombs could not be launched by rockets, aircraft, submarines or artillery. Such means would cease to exist. One might say, of course, that a nuclear bomb could be delivered in a suitcase. However, this belongs to the realm of detective novels. I consider that a convincing answer on this score was given by the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, and again today by the representative of Sweden. Consequently, the question of the possibility of an actual nuclear attack under these conditions no longer arises.

I should like to point out in this connexion the fact that the Soviet Union proposes to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the very beginning of disarmament at a time when the whole world is aware of the Soviet Union's great achievements in the field of the most perfected means of delivery - ballistic missiles. This fact in itself stresses the good will and the desire for agreement, on which the Soviet draft treaty is based.

Perhaps an attack would be carried out by conventional means of waging war? But this idea also is absurd since the Soviet Union proposes a drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in the first stage. Here it is appropriate to stress once again that we propose a considerably larger reduction of our forces than the United States, which talks so much of the danger to the West of the large armed forces of the Soviet Union. As we know, in the Soviet draft treaty an equal force level is proposed in the first stage for the United States and the Soviet Union. As regards the force levels of other States, we have in mind to reduce these levels in such a way as to ensure an overall balance. Moreover, as I have already explained at previous meetings, simultaneously with the reduction of armed forces to the fixed levels, conventional armaments would be reduced in such a way that the quantity of weapons retained by States in the first stage would be strictly limited to the quantity needed for equipping only the remaining limited armed forces.

I repeat that not only military experts but diplomats know that the carrying out of an attack or any offensive operation at all requires a preponderance in the number of armed forces. But how can one talk of an attack with the use of conventional armaments when these armed forces are equal?

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To sum up, I am bound to say that the arguments of the Western Powers in favour of retaining foreign military bases in alien territories for the reasons which we were told on 8 May, do not stand up to criticism.

Now I shall deal with the arguments of the Western delegations to the effect that the elimination of foreign military bases would be tantamount to the renunciation of co-operation between the Western Powers. This argument was vigorously expounded by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. He asked:

"How can we be asked to forgo the help of our major allies when on the other side the military, political and economic links would remain intact, and continue to expand, in fact, to the farthest limits of Asia?" (ENDC/PV.33, p.14)

I must say quite frankly that we were simply amazed at such a statement by Mr. Cavalletti. If we were to take his statement as true, it would appear that not only the whole military, but also the political and economic structure of the Western countries is founded solely on military bases in foreign territories. It would appear that if foreign military bases in alien territories were eliminated, the whole Western world would literally disintegrate and all the political and economic ties between these States would disappear. The absurdity of such a thesis is so obvious that presumably it did not escape Mr. Cavalletti himself. The fact that he used such arguments tells against him. It merely shows up the weakness and lack of foundation of the arguments in defence of retaining foreign military bases in alien territories, which makes it necessary to have recourse to such absurdities. However, if Mr. Cavalletti were to persist in his assertions, it would become obvious to everyone that the whole essence of the unity and co-operation of the so-called free Western world consists in its military alliance for purposes which have nothing in common with the freedom of the peoples or with the interests of peace.

However, the arguments of the representative of Italy have a certain inner meaning and, I would say, a meaning which is extremely dangerous to the cause of disarmament. At the informal meeting of 10 May I was obliged, by force of circumstances, to touch upon a question which we had previously avoided, not wishing to provoke polemics on certain general political questions. But since the whole Western Press is now writing about the informal meeting, at which no Press correspondents were present, I think that this question will have to be raised at an open meeting, although, in principle, open meetings are also private.

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The point is that the very logic of general and complete disarmament raises the question of the inevitability of the dissolution of military alliances. If our task is to create a world without weapons and wars, or, to use the expression of the United States delegation, general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, it is perfectly clear that in such a world there is not and cannot be any room for military alliances.

However, as Mr. Cavalletti's statement shows, the Western Powers do not wish to accept the idea that it is necessary to do away with the system of military bloc. They do not even envisage one single step towards solving this problem, which is inescapable in the conditions of general and complete disarmament. For Mr. Cavalletti, the preservation of military blocs and military bases in foreign territories is not in doubt, at least not within a period of history that can be foreseen.

But is it possible with such an attitude to approach the real implementation of general and complete disarmament? Of course not.

I shall not dwell in detail on the attempts to put national and foreign military bases on an equal footing. The Soviet delegation has already emphasized the great fundamental difference between national bases -- or, to be more precise, the services and ancillary installations in the national territories of States in places where their armed forces are stationed -- and foreign military bases. Bases in foreign territories are a striking force comprising troops and military equipment advanced towards the territory of a State, which is regarded as a potential adversary or target for attack, not to mention the fact that this is one of the open ways of ensuring the political influence of certain great Powers in the territories of weaker States. Foreign military bases situated many thousands of kilometres from the national boundaries of the States organizing these bases have never been and cannot be of a defensive character. By their very nature they are intended for purposes of attack and aggression. This fact alone is sufficient to require the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories at the very beginning of disarmament. The implementation of disarmament and the retention of strong points, the foci of aggression for attacking neighbouring States, are incompatible, if we are talking seriously about disarmament and not indulging in a play of words.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

That is what the argument in defence of foreign military bases in alien territories looks like in practice.

In connexion with the question of the elimination of foreign military bases, I should like to refer to certain points in the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright. Although Sir Michael did not say so directly, the main point in his statement was likewise an attempt to justify the retention of foreign military bases in alien territories. Sir Michael Wright went further and justified not only the retention of military bases, but also the means of delivering nuclear weapons. In disguising this basic idea, he asserted that the Soviet proposals for stage 1 would represent "an imbalance in terms of our security" (ENDC/PV.33, p.30) He tried to prove that the Soviet proposals do not take into account the difference in the geographical position of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the one hand, and the Western Powers, on the other, as a result of which the first stage of disarmament under the Soviet draft treaty might create the threat of an attack by the Soviet Union on the Western Powers.

He said:

"But the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries are land Powers. They can use roads, they can walk and ride and drive to help each other, or for any military purpose. The United Kingdom is an island. Our friends can come to our help and we can go to theirs only by using sea and air communications, and it is on ships and aircraft, rather than on land forces, that we rely for our defence and our communications. But under the Soviet proposals our naval ships and military aircraft capable of being nuclear weapon carriers -- and that means all of them, or virtually all of them -- would have been scrapped by the end of the first stage." (ibid, p.30)

And Sir Michael Wright concluded:

"The Warsaw Pact countries would be left with their traditional means of defence. Our traditional means of defence would almost wholly have disappeared." (ibid)

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The arguments which I put forward to prove the absurdity of the assertions regarding a military attack by the Soviet Union on the Western Powers as a result of the implementation of the first stage of disarmament are even more obvious in the light of Sir Michael Wright's statement. Sir Michael Wright is perturbed at the idea that the means of delivery of all nuclear weapons would be destroyed, including warships and aircraft, and that the situation of the island of Britain would become untenable. However, one may ask what represents a real threat to the island of Britain: infantry or troops equipped with aircraft and rockets, ships and submarines? I am not a military historian, but I do know what a threat to the United Kingdom, both during the First and Second World Wars, was created, for example, by submarines or aircraft. Therefore we propose to destroy in the first stage precisely that which represents a deadly threat to the British Isles. But the United Kingdom representative is not satisfied with this and talks about an imbalance in our proposals. It is quite impossible to understand such logic.

Sir Michael Wright sees a threat in the assumption that, as he put it, the Warsaw Pact countries would be left with their traditional means of defence, whereas the United Kingdom's traditional means of defence would almost wholly have disappeared. In all Sir Michael Wright's arguments there is one radical defect: he paints the picture as though unilateral disarmament would be carried out. The West would disarm, would eliminate both armaments and military equipment but the Warsaw Pact countries would remain as they are. The truth, however, is that we propose equal disarmament for both sides and not for one side alone. Consequently, all the arguments of Sir Michael Wright about the need to keep aircraft, ships and so forth, in order to give assistance to allies, are devoid of any foundation.

No attack will be possible, since there will be nothing with which to attack -- in particular, to attack the island of Britain. Land forces will be withdrawn from foreign territories. The armies of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic can hardly be a threat to the German Federal Republic or to France, even if these countries are not given great assistance by the United Kingdom. Thus, for the defence of Western Europe and the United Kingdom itself those naval and air forces which Sir Michael Wright described as the traditional means of the United Kingdom will not be necessary, because potential enemies will not have such means either. But perhaps these traditional means are needed by the

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

United Kingdom for aggression or for punitive expeditions in various parts of the world? If this is so, then, of course, under conditions of general and complete disarmament such aggressive intentions will have to be abandoned. It cannot be helped. Once we have signed a treaty on general and complete disarmament, all such measures will have to cease.

Sir Michael Wright based a considerable part of his arguments on the premise that, allegedly, a good many Western countries are mistrustful of the intentions of the Soviet Union in regard to these countries. It is well-known that in the United States and the United Kingdom this fear of a threat on the part of the Soviet Union is being systematically propagated. But what is the real situation?

This is described very aptly by a well-known United States historian, Professor D.F. Fleming of Vanderbilt University, in his very sound book "The Cold War and its Origins", which was published in London in 1961. Sir Michael Wright might familiarize himself with this work. Among other things the author quotes a statement by the well-known United States General MacArthur, who certainly never felt any sympathy for the Soviet Union. As far back as 1957 General Douglas MacArthur made the following statement:

"Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear - kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervour - with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."

Finally, if one puts the question in this way and if one starts out from the premise that everyone fears the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union alone, how then shall we ever get as far as general and complete disarmament and why then are we here at all?

Mr. Dean also spoke at some length about an alleged imbalance in the Soviet disarmament plan. In this connexion he dealt with the question of the force levels in the first stage and described the United States proposal of a force level of 2.1 million as a more balanced one. However, I must say that all his arguments in support of retaining large armed forces in the first stage sound unconvincing and confirm our conclusion that the force level of 2.1 million proposed by the United States is precisely connected with calculations aimed at retaining in the first stage foreign military bases in alien territories without any change whatsoever.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

On the one hand, he supported the thesis of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, that manpower is at the present time less important than armaments and, on the other hand, he asserted quite the opposite when he emphasized that the United States wishes to retain trained personnel in order to ensure its security and to fulfil its commitments in respect of its allies in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world.

Today he tried again to accuse us of underestimating the reduction of armed forces and armaments, although we ourselves propose a more drastic reduction of these forces than the United States.

We cannot recognize as serious Mr. Dean's attempt to prove the advantages of the United States force level of 2.1 million by references to alleged connexions with the question of control. Both with regard to the level of 2.1 million and with regard to 1.7 million we shall have to apply the same methods of control and we shall meet with the same difficulties, if indeed any difficulties arise. This is no argument. In this sense there is no difference. The real difference is that the Soviet Union proposes a greater volume of disarmament with regard to the level of armed forces and conventional armaments than does the United States.

In connexion with this question of the level of armed forces in the Stage I, I should like to remark that we are simply amazed at Mr. Dean's repeated allegation that:

"... the Soviet Union has no specific proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I." (ENDC/PV.33, p.34)

After all, the delegations have at their disposal the Soviet draft treaty, which sets out in black and white quite specific proposals regarding the reduction of conventional weapons of all kinds, types and categories up to the level strictly necessary for equipping the provisionally remaining armed forces. It seems to me that this question is so clear that I would consider it advisable, for the sake of businesslike discussion, not to revert to such unsubstantiated assertions as those to which, unfortunately, Mr. Dean has recourse.

The same applies to Mr. Dean's remarks about the possible transfer of armaments from units which are being disbanded to units which remain on a temporary basis. But if we start out from what I would call a cheat's approach to disarmament, then there is and will be such a possibility under any disarmament plan, whether it is that of the Soviet Union or that of the United States,

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if we have in mind not responsible governments but cheats. But I do not think we should approach from such a criminological point of view the consideration of any proposal before the Committee.

The Western representatives have devoted considerable attention in their statements to questions of control. The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, also spoke about these questions this morning. The characteristic feature of their remarks was their attempt to read their own interpretation into the Agreed Principles of disarmament. Sir Michael Wright made this attempt in the most outspoken way. He tried to interpret the Agreed Principles in such a way as to make out that they provided for the verification of the remaining armaments. However, the first sentence of paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles states quite clearly:

"All disarmament measures -- and I emphasize "all disarmament measures" --- should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations". (ENDC/5, p.2)

These are disarmament obligations. Here it is perfectly clear that control over disarmament is concerned. And, of course, it was not by chance that the United States delegation, after reaching agreement on the principles of disarmament, put forward its own document, to which Mr. Dean referred and in which the United States delegation insisted on its own position, namely, the verification of the remaining armaments. This is not in the Agreed Principles and therefore Sir Michael Wright's efforts to read into the Agreed Principles something which they do not contain were quite in vain. This is similar to the way in which the principles of the eight Powers regarding the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests are interpreted, where a meaning which is not in the principles is read into them.

The main argument used by the Western Powers to justify their demand for the verification of the remaining armaments was the possibility of armaments being concealed. Today Mr. Burns spoke about this at some length. If we approach the question of disarmament realistically, we can easily see that such a way of stating the question is artificial and far-fetched.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In discussing the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, most appropriately reminded us the other day of the immense moral force of international obligations, especially obligations in such an important field as disarmament.

When they sign a treaty which has been discussed freely or has been agreed at meetings over a number of years, the States assume a great -- I would say -- historic responsibility. Every State values its good name and, obviously, it will not venture to violate a treaty or engage in concealments. Indeed, from a practical point of view, in the conditions of international control over disarmament, such concealments on the scale required for the achievement of the aims of aggression would be impossible. In order to gain any advantage from the concealment of weapons and to use such secret weapons for military or political purposes, it is perfectly clear that it would be necessary to conceal not only one tank or aircraft and not only one submarine or missile but considerable quantities of such arms. Even if we admit the idea that a nuclear bomb can be concealed, every reasonable person realizes that such a bomb would be used not in order to make a big noise, but for definite military and political purposes -- for invading and subjugating foreign territories.

But can such military and political aims be achieved by means of one or two bombs, or by means of one nuclear weapon? Obviously it would be necessary to occupy a territory and establish one's own control there. But it is impossible to do this without the existence of large armed forces and other military means. It is obvious to everyone, however, that any preparation of such forces and such military means could not remain unnoticed by the international control organ. And any State would immediately be unmasked and would be condemned by the peoples of the world.

This shows quite clearly the artificial nature of the question of the possible concealment of the large quantity of weapons required for an attack. Such a thing would be an absolutely futile adventure from the State point of view. It is unthinkable in these days when millions of people stand guard for peace.

We heard what Mr. Burns said today and what Sir Michael Wright said on 8 May, as to what follows from this. I quote the question raised by Sir Michael Wright on 8 May:

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"The question, therefore, is whether the 100 per cent inspection spoken of by Mr. Zorin would include verification that there are no weapons hidden 'under the jacket'. If it does include this, an important avenue of progress is opened up. If it does not include this, the problem remains with us both over conventional forces and arms levels and over nuclear delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.33, p.29)

Today Mr. Burns repeated the same question: do you include verification that there are no hidden weapons? Very well, if we include it, then what follows from this? Now I ask you: how do you envisage verifying the presence of these hidden weapons? Explain this to us. This point is not only included in our plan but it is in yours as well. Explain it. What do you have in mind when you speak of verifying the presence of hidden weapons in the territory of a country of 22 million square kilometres? How will you verify the presence of hidden weapons? Explain this, Mr. Burns. You are a military man. Explain how you envisage searching for these hidden weapons. Will you send agents to all parts of the country throughout the territory of the Soviet Union or the United States? What will these agents do? It suffices to raise the question in its practical aspect for you to realize that such an approach to this question is unrealistic.

How do you envisage the process of verification in the territory of a country like the Soviet Union or the United States? Will you send millions of people to verify the presence of hidden weapons?

You are merely raising the sort of questions you do in the expectation that they will embarrass those to whom you put them. But these are problems with which not only we are faced and which affect our plan; these are problems with which you too are faced and which affect your plan. Well then, out with it, answer us: how do you envisage verification?

In principle, we are in favour of it. Explain to us now, how you envisage this verification. What system of control do you envisage? At the informal meeting I said: it is not without reason that you have now given up a 100 per cent verification of the remaining armaments. It is not without reason that you have given it up, representatives of the United States, because you realize that it is not feasible in practice. It would require such a huge amount of money, such a huge number of people, that it would be more costly than disarmament itself.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

So you shift over to a different system. You propose a sampling, zonal system of verification. Why? Not because of our objections but because you yourselves have realized that your talk about a 100 per cent verification of the remaining armaments and armed forces is impossible in practice. You yourselves have realized this. Then why are you now putting to us the question: How do you propose to verify whether there are hidden weapons? I put the question to you: how do you propose to do this? Explain this to us.

The Soviet Union is proposing a well thought-out system of control over disarmament. Under our proposals, the international disarmament organization will receive, before the beginning of disarmament, the necessary information concerning the armaments and armed forces which are possessed by States and which are to be reduced or eliminated. Thus the amount of the impending reductions will be accurately known. The actual implementation of the reductions of armed forces or the elimination of armaments will take place under the eyes of the controllers, who will scrupulously verify each operation of such reductions of armed forces and destruction of armaments.

The breadth and scope of control will continuously increase. One has only to read carefully the first stage of the Soviet disarmament plan to see how wide a control we are proposing. Controllers will be present at all places where the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are being eliminated. By the way, I take this opportunity to reply to some extent to the question put by the representative of Sweden. Control would cover not only missile storage depots or places where aircraft are stationed, but also missile launching pads. Controllers will be able to inspect plants engaged wholly or partly in producing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Finally, controllers will be present at the places where divisions and other military formations are being disbanded.

In the stage II, this control will be extended not only by further control over the subsequent reductions of armed forces, that is over the disbandment of further divisions and military formations, but also by control over the atomic industry. This will cover diffusion plants, plants for processing fuel elements, large reactors, plants producing mechanical and other devices, atom bombs, etc.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The further widening of control in the stage III will have the result that the whole territory of any State will be open for verification. In these circumstances, how can one seriously talk about weapons being concealed? Such talk can have only one aim, namely to confuse a clear matter, to sow the poisonous seeds of suspicion and to make unnecessary and unjustified difficulties in achieving an agreement on disarmament.

In this connexion, I find it difficult to understand the logic which Mr. Dean has been following in trying to interpret our approach to questions of control. I shall disregard the inappropriate comparisons to which the United States representative resorted and which can have no other purpose than to cause the atmosphere of our discussion to deteriorate.

We approach these negotiations as a serious and responsible business and not as a circus performance. The best evidence of our attitude towards these negotiations is the draft treaty which contains carefully thought-out, well-balanced and equitable proposals which ensure a swift and radical solution of the disarmament problem.

The interpretation which Mr. Dean gives to our position on control distorts, indeed flagrantly distorts, our position. Mr. Dean said at the thirty-third meeting:

"As members are aware, the Soviet draft treaty proposes a
100 per cent elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I"
(ENDC/PV.33, p.40).

Here Mr. Dean is quite right. We propose the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage and we have explained in detail why such an approach is necessary. The threat of a nuclear war must be eliminated and the practical way to do this in the present circumstances is to neutralize nuclear weapons and to destroy their means of delivery.

Mr. Dean does not agree with the neutralization of nuclear weapons and he is against the elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. The only argument he adduces in support of this position is that the balance would be upset. But I have already shown in my previous remarks that this argument is without any serious foundation. I return to Mr. Dean's comments. We went on to say:

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"Mr. Zorin's interpretation appears to mean that the international disarmament organization could watch the destruction of each delivery vehicle that the Soviet Union was prepared to offer for destruction, but that it could not -- I repeat, could not -- verify that all vehicles had in fact been offered." (ibid)

That was what Mr. Dean said.

Now I should like to ask on what grounds he drew such a conclusion? Where, when, at what meeting, did the Soviet delegation say that when nuclear weapon delivery vehicles were being completely eliminated, the international disarmament commission would not be able to verify whether all such vehicles were in fact being eliminated? You will not find such a statement on our part; it does not exist. There is, however, something else -- there is the Soviet draft treaty and, finally, there are our direct replies to the questions put by Mr. Burns, from which, I think, every unbiased person will easily draw the opposite conclusion to that which Mr. Dean wished to suggest to the Committee.

The question at present is a different one. It is a question of how this is to be carried out, how it is to be verified. And here I should like to appeal to your collective reason. I request Mr. Dean, Mr. Burns, Mr. Cavalletti, Sir Michael Wright and also Mr. Godber, to tell us how they envisage the verification of this secret retention of weapons? Explain this to us; we want to learn from you. It is not a question that gives rise to any difficulties for us from the point of view of principle. It is a purely practical question. We can reach agreement on the methods of such verification, if we reach agreement on the substance of the disarmament programme. Any putting forward of questions of that kind is an attempt to evade solving the question of the disarmament programme, of disarmament measures as such. That is the crux of the matter. And when Mr. Burns said today that he was not satisfied with the way in which I explained Mr. Khrushchev's position regarding the disarmament plan and control, he showed very plainly what it was that failed to satisfy him. This was also shown by Sir Michael Wright, or Mr. Dean -- I have forgotten exactly who it was, but it comes almost to the same thing. When you expressed your dissatisfaction, what was it that dissatisfied you in my answer?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I will tell you what it was. You said that you were dissatisfied because Mr. Zorin says; "Accept the Soviet disarmament plan". Mr. Burns went on to say: "But that plan is unacceptable to us". So there you have the crux of the matter. Therefore it is not a question of control but a question of the content of the plan and of the content of the measures which we propose. That is the crux of the matter. Therefore our differences are not over control, but over the content of disarmament. That is what we have been telling you all along, gentlemen, while you keep on asserting, keep on feeding to your Press and trying to make out that the Soviet Union is against control whereas you are in favour of control. The truth is altogether different.

We are no less decidedly in favour of such control as is possible and necessary, and our differences with you are not on this subject. Our disarmament plan is unacceptable to you -- that is the crux of the matter. Let us now come to an agreement on the plan. Let us see what is acceptable and what is not, what proposals you put forward regarding the plan, how you wish to disarm in fact. When we reach agreement on this question it will be very easy to reach agreement on the question of control, because on the principles of the approach to the question of control there are no serious differences between us, except for your desire to verify the remaining armaments. But this desire is only for the sake of propaganda, because when you approach this question in a practical manner, you yourselves renounce a 100 per cent verification of the remaining armaments. That is perfectly clear to us now. Therefore all attempts to make out that the Soviet Union has not given a clear reply as to how the presence of hidden weapons is to be verified in the case of a 100 per cent destruction of this or that type of armament are quite worthless from the point of view of the essence of the matter.

But that is not the real issue. We can reach agreement with you on all the measures which would ensure this. But let us first of all agree on the substance of the disarmament measures, on the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. That is the real question. Do you or do you not want real disarmament? Do you or do you not want such measures as would solve the question of removing the threat of a nuclear war? That is the real question. We must reach agreement on that theme first and foremost.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This has been clearly confirmed by the statement which Mr. Burns made this morning. Our basic differences are not on the question of control, but on the substance of the disarmament programme.

There is no need to wonder why Mr. Dean fails to take note of what is in our disarmament programme lying before him on the table. It does not satisfy him, and it does not satisfy him because the United States is in fact opposed to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, it is opposed to the immediate removal of the threat of a nuclear warfare, opposed to the elimination of foreign military bases, which are a survival of Dulles' policy of keeping the world on the brink of war, to which, nevertheless, the new United States Government continues to adhere.

It is obvious to everyone that if the Soviet Union and the United States jointly and simultaneously eliminate their missiles, aircraft, and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons together with simultaneous elimination of foreign bases and the reduction of armed forces, the balance will not be impaired at all. And so, in order to bolster up his position somehow, the United States representative interprets our position on control in a tendentious manner and paints a fearsome picture regarding the possible concealment of means of delivery.

But, Mr. Dean, even a child knows that missiles and their launching pads are not needles, that bomber aircraft are not tennis balls, and that submarines are not pleasure yachts -- they are not easily hidden. In the end, one must give up artificial arguments and face facts, as becomes grown-up people.

We say frankly and honestly that in the course of the disarmament process some armaments and armed forces not subject to reduction or elimination during a given stage will remain outside of control, but the main point is that these armed forces and armaments will be continually reduced until they are brought down to zero. It is asserted that this involves a certain risk. Yes, there is a certain risk. I fully agree with what the representative of Sweden has said today to the effect that disarmament cannot be achieved without taking some risks. But they are just as significant for the Soviet Union as they are for other countries. If we are mistrusted, we are just as much entitled not to trust those who do not trust us. Nevertheless, we are prepared to take such a risk in order to achieve real disarmament, since no control -- as, incidentally,

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Mr. Dean has also said today --- can provide 100 per cent foolproof assurance. We know that a risk of a similar kind, but far more serious in scope and nature, exists at the present time. We are now faced with the risk of a terrible thermo-nuclear war. It is precisely this risk which compels us to be here in Geneva and to strive to find a speedy and practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Without a bold and, I would say, fearless approach to this tremendous problem, it cannot be resolved. What matters is not this or that detail of control, as the representatives of the Western Powers and the Press inspired by them keep on trying to maintain, but a bold and responsible political decision by their Governments to set about at last the implementation of radical and drastic disarmament measures in the first stage in order to remove first and foremost the tremendous threat of a nuclear missile war and thereby clear the way towards a really thorough disarmament process moving rapidly and right to the end, and towards the strengthening of confidence and co-operation among States. Precisely such a path to disarmament is proposed by the Soviet Government from the very first stage of the programme which is submitted for your consideration in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Those are the remarks which the Soviet delegation deemed it necessary to make in connexion with the statements made by the Western Powers at the meeting on 8 May.

I should like to devote another couple of minutes to a matter which in my opinion deserves attention. Yesterday, we held a private informal meeting of the Committee. We did not admit even members of our delegation to this meeting, because it was a private one. We restricted ourselves to three or four members of our delegation. We excluded all those who do not sit at this table. Yet what was the result? After a frank, informal and confidential exchange of opinions, everything leaked out.

The United States, British and Geneva Press write about this private and informal meeting in even greater detail than they do about our formal meetings. Mr. Barrington did not read out to us yesterday the text of the communique in order not to say who had spoken, etc. But why was all this necessary, if the Press states in detail who asked questions, who answered them, who spoke and what he said? If only all this had been correctly reported! But everything that was

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said has been distorted, and it has been distorted in a tendentious manner, with a definite Western slant. We are aware that representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom delegations yesterday held a special briefing session for their correspondents about this private meeting. I should like to ask on what grounds this is done. What is the sense of holding private informal meetings if the Western Powers, following such meetings, instruct their correspondents how they should write, what they should mention, and what they should write in connexion with what was said at a private informal meeting? Is it not a mockery of the very sense of our closed, private, personal conferences?

I apologise for raising this question towards the end of today's meeting (just before lunch, perhaps I shall spoil the appetites of some of my colleagues), but I considered it my duty to speak about this matter also because we have been repeatedly accused of conducting negotiations for propaganda purposes. But in fact when we want to discuss in a friendly and informal manner some of the substantive questions with which we are faced, without avoiding answers to any questions which may be put to us in an informal and unofficial way, without a verbatim record, then all this is brought out into the open for the definite purpose of Western propaganda. This does not indicate good will on the part of the Western powers or their desire to conduct serious and real negotiations.

We shall be compelled to draw the appropriate conclusions from this.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): It is almost two o'clock. In addition to the last question raised by our Soviet colleague, the representative of Italy had asked for the floor to exercise his right of reply, and the United Kingdom representative had asked for the floor to raise a point of procedure. I am, of course, in the hands of the Committee, but I would be inclined to the view that it might be better if all subsequent statements which representatives might wish to make today were deferred to our next meeting on Monday. I hope that this will be acceptable to the Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I am willing to accept your proposal. But I should also like to express the wish that Mr. Zorin would not always speak at such length that it becomes almost impossible for other representatives to take the floor, even though they were to speak at breathless speed.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I had wished to make some remarks this morning, but in the circumstances I reserve my right to make them at a later meeting. I would only say that I hope that in future the Soviet representative will not raise a slightly controversial matter, such as he has just raised, at such a late hour when no one else is given a chance to reply. Having said that, I gladly yield the floor to the general and complete desire for lunch.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-fifth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Bulgaria, Sweden, Canada, the Soviet Union, Italy and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 14 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.